Abstract
Introduction
On 5 May 2013, Hefazat E Islam, a loose Islamist platform, composed of a dozen or so Islamist organisations, based at 25,000 madrasshas (Sabir, 2013) and allegedly financed by Saudi Arabia (Banyan, 2017) organised a sit-in in downtown Dhaka, Bangladesh's capital. It was attended by more than 500,000 people from all over the country (Boussou, 2013) . A month ago it had organised a similar sit-in and had promised to return if the state failed to act. Hefazat was demanding the enactment of a blasphemy law and exemplary punishment for the on-line activists who criticised the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) and insulted Islam in their writings. Its thirteen point demand to the government also included: the abolishment of the National Women's Development Policy 1 and measures to prevent the 'infiltration of alien culture,' and 'a ban on immodesty, lewdness, misconduct and free mixing of men and women in public in the name of freedom of expression' (Sabur 2013 ).
These demands on limiting women's mobility, women's interactions in the public sphere, and control of women's dress and economic participation, are not unusual. The head of Hefazat, Moulana Shah Ahmed Shafi, described unveiled women as 'tamrind' (a popular sour fruit), implying that men have no control over themselves when they see an unveiled woman just as one has no control and starts to salivate at the site of tamrind (Dhaka Tribune, 2013) . The show of strength by Hefazat, made actors working on women's rights question whether their positions and strategies were effective to protect the gains made so far and whether the state would backtrack and compromise on women's rights. Undeniably, the demands and framings used by Hefazat to mobilise support were anti-women. But they were based on an older narrative that placed Bangladeshi women in two camps -those who are 'religious/moral/good/traditional/authentic' and those who are 'secular/immoral/bad/modern/ Western'. These framings have a strong appeal and legitimacy among the wider public. The large numbers of Hefazat supporters brings home the fact that despite the rapid social development gains-attaining gender parity in girl's education, declining fertility rates and improved access to contraception, and improving financial and other services for women; a large number of Bangladeshis hold very complex and conflicted views on women's empowerment and rights (Jahan, 1995; Hossain, 2017) .
In this article, I investigate how these binary framings of women's agency and identity influenced struggles over women's rights and the interpretation of the relationship between Islam and women's empowerment in Bangladesh. By examining particular episodes when these framings were deployed by religious political parties and religious scholars (ulema) and the counter framings developed by feminists, I trace the genealogies of these binary constructs and how these were influenced by the shifts in regional and international politics.
The examination of the genealogies of the binary framings and how they have influenced the struggle over women's empowerment in Bangladesh is important for several reasons. First, empirical research on Bangladesh questioning the binary framings and its implication on struggles for women's empowerment and over state accountability in light of the rise of research that identifies Islam as a barrier to modernity and women's empowerment (Kabeer, 1989; Rozario, 1992) or research on political Islam, identity politics and their impact on women's rights and NGO work (Hashemi,2000; Shehabuddin, 2008a) . The findings presented here contribute to the scholarship on Bangladesh by extending the analysis of women's religious subjectivities (Huq, 2008; Huq 2010) beyond the individual domain to the realm of politics. A focus on gender and Islam in a non-Middle Eastern, democratic, Muslim majority country also contributes to the body of scholarship on Islam and gender studies, which generally privileges the Middle Eastern and North African countries, Iran, Turkey and to some extent Pakistan (Shehabuddin, 2008b) .
Second, this article demonstrates the importance of taking the broader context into account when interpreting the mutually constitutive relationship between religion and women's empowerment. Scholars have long highlighted that women belonging to the Islamist movements are able to exert considerable agency. They also point out that women's engagement in Islamist movements can be read as a resistance against Western imperialism or as a failure of modernising projects of oppressive regimes (Mahmood, 2005) . Bangladeshi scholars have used this understanding of women's religious subjectivity to explore women's agency, the multiplicity of women's subjective positions and selfactualisation through construction of the virtuous-self based on the good/moral/authentic/Muslim womanhood (Huq, 2008; White, 2010; Naher, 2010; Hussain, 2010; Huq, 2010 In the next section I discuss my positionality and methods used to collect data. I provide a brief overview of how religion and politics are intertwined in Bangladesh and the major developments in Bangladesh politics in the next section. I also discuss the specific historical junctures when these binary framings emerged. A brief analysis of the main trends in scholarship on women's empowerment and religion in Bangladesh in the third section reveals how the relationship between women and Islam is interpreted and unpacked by scholars producing knowledge on women's empowerment.
Some of this analysis uses these binary framings. Based on my interviews and secondary data, I provide an analysis of some of the key episodes during the last and present decades where these binary framings were used by the Islamists against the women's rights activists to delegitimise their claims. I also explore the counter framings used by the feminists to advocate for women's rights. In the last section I discuss the implications of these binary framings for women's empowerment and state accountability.
Positionality and methodology
The primary research used in this paper was conducted for a large research The three research projects mentioned above include: one on women's movement actors and their constituency building strategies; another on women in religious political parties; and the last one on the conceptualisation of women's empowerment by different actors in Bangladesh. The research with women's rights activists focused on three national level organisations mobilising around specific gender equity issues. The members of these groups interviewed were professional middle-class women. The methods included semi structured interviews with twenty key informants, secondary document analysis and validation workshops with all three organisations. 2 The research on women in religious political groups focused on how urban-based middle to lower middle class women perceived specific policy changes. The methods included: newspaper scans of five dailies with different political leanings on selected policy debates, statements made by religious political parties on these policies, analysis of party manifestoes and publications on women's rights, twenty life histories with selected women leaders, ten interviews with male leaders, and four group discussions with women's associations linked to these parties and Qu'ran reading groups. The research on the conceptualisation of women's empowerment used secondary document analysis and archival research. My own and the research team's positionality influenced the access to the three women's rights organisations and also the religious political parties and Qu'ran reading groups for women. Gaining access to women's rights groups as a feminist academic was relatively easier as the members of these groups were familiar with my work and that of fellow colleagues.
Access to the religious political parties and Qu'ran reading groups proved to be a challenge. We used the informal networks our team members had built through their previous work to approach the interviewees. Preexisting informal relations allayed the resistance that we may have faced as researchers working on women's rights. While the existing informal connections were useful for initial contact, we, then, had to formally approach the female interviewees through the male leaders we interviewed. This was a necessary step as the female members of the religious political parties wanted to ensure that they had permission from the party hierarchy. (Sobhan, 2015; Jahan, 1972) . The attempts to 'purify' the Bengali Given that a common religious identity had failed to deliver on development and national unity, and that the Bengalis had mobilised around a cultural-linguistic identity and secularism, meant that after Bangladeshi politics is dominated by two major centrist political parties.
The Awami League, a centre-left party, led the nationalist struggle. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), a centre-right party, was founded by General Ziaur Rahman, after he took over power in the mid-1970s. Both of these parties led the struggle for democracy in the 1980s against General Ershad (1982 Ershad ( -1990 . The political Left has a very weak presence in Bangladeshi politics (Hassan, 2013) . The religious political parties have steadily gained ground in the public sphere since the creation of the state.
Electorally the largest Islamist party, Jamat I Islami, has secured between four to eight percent of votes in national elections since 1991, and has been in the coalition government through tacit or overt alliances with the AL or the BNP since 1991 (Siddiqui, 2006; Hassan and Nazneen, 2017) . This significantly raised the Islamic bloc's power (Siddiqui, 2006; ).
The Constitution formulated in 1972 included secularism as a key principle but this was removed by Ziaur Rahman and replaced with 'faith in the almighty Allah'. In 1977, Ziaur Rahman also allowed for religious political parties to function. These changes were made to consolidate Bangladesh's identity as a Muslim majority country and to strengthen ties with the Middle East. The religious political parties were banned by the AL given Jamaat and other groups had supported the Pakistani army during the liberation war in 1971 (Riaz, 2014) . General Ershad further blurred the boundaries between the state and religion, when he pushed for the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which declared Islam as the state religion in 1988 (White, 2010) . Secularism was included as a principle again in the Constitution after a Supreme Court verdict led to another amendment of Middle East (primarily to Saudi Arabia) and were exposed to the cultural practices and brought these conservative practices based on Wahabi Islam back to Bangladesh (Kabeer, 1991; Harrison, 2015) .
Aid dependency during the decades of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s meant that the Bangladeshi state pursued a women's development agenda to secure funds and gain international legitimacy. In the last two decades aid dependency has significantly reduced (only 2 percent of the annual budget), but the development and NGO sector work remains donor driven (Hossain, 2017) . Foreign funding has shaped the gender and development agenda in Bangladesh as issues that gained prominence in international development were prioritised to secure funding. The decades also witnessed the growth of a large foreign-funded NGOs sector that targeted rural poor women in their programmes on microcredit, health, education, and legal aid (Hossain, 2017) . The growth of the NGO sector created scope for women's rights actors to engage in designing development programmes and create allies for promoting women's rights (Nazneen and Sultan, 2014) . But this engagement came at a price as the availability of international funding influenced the women's rights agenda and the autonomous nature of the movement was questioned by the wider public (Chowdhury, 2009 ). Women's movement actors have struggled to retain their legitimacy as representatives of women's interests. They have packaged their demands in a manner so that they would not be branded as 'inauthentic/Western/elite' (Nazneen and Sultan, 2014) .
At present, Bangladesh is at a critical juncture where changes to the social and cultural fabric is taking place at a fast pace. Recent years have seen a rise in the number of organisations funded by Middle Eastern countries providing services to the rural and urban poor. Significant funds have been invested to establish hospitals and Islamic schools (both madrassh and English medium schools). 4 There is also an increase in veiling and public practice of Islamic rituals (namaz) among the wider public (White, 2010) .
This shift in the public presence of Islam is accompanied by the growth of the new middle class and a moneyed elite class whose position on religion's presence in public life is different from the old cultural elite, who played an active part is emphasising Bengali nationalism and viewed religion as belonging to the private domain (Yasmin, 2016) . Several factors have influenced the middle class to push for a more overt presence of religion in public life. These include: the rise of religious nationalism since the 1990s; the need to reassert a Muslim identity given global and regional push-back against Islam in the last decades; and the change in access to communications technology and the rise of popular TV and other types of virtual platforms that promote a more austere and pure form of Islam.
After 9/11 Bangladesh also witnessed the presence of home-grown extremist groups such as the banned Jamat-Ul-Mujaheedin (JMB) that carried out a series of bombings in 2005 (Griffiths and Hasan, 2015) .
Bangladesh also witnessed an increased presence of globally connected networks such as Hurkatul Jihad-I-Islmai Bangladesh (HUJI-B), and other groups such as Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Ahle Hadith Andolon (AHAB). These groups reject the secular/liberal laws and systems of governance and demand an establishment of Shari'a law and systems in Bangladesh. They have carried out attacks against state officials, scholars and on-line activists (Griffiths and Hasan, 2015) . While links these extremist groups may have with the local Islamist political parties or with Islamist civil society organisations is debatable, their sporadic activities have created a sense of vulnerability among the liberal scholars, activists and civil society organisations. The latest in the strings of attack was carried out by an extremist group which claimed a link to Islamic State (IS). women's empowerment (White, 2010) . These bodies of work illustrate the way binary framings have influenced interpretations on women's empowerment in Bangladesh and the attempts to move away from these easy binaries by the feminist scholars.
The development literature on women's empowerment from the 1970s to the mid-1990s discuss religion mainly in relation to purdah (Women for Women, 1975 ), women's rights contained in religious texts and its influence on existing law (Sobhan, 1980) , and ethnographic studies that explore local religious norms (Hartmann and Boyce, 1983; Rozario, 1992) .
The focus of these studies is on the modernisation of women through economic, social and political participation (White, 2010) . These studies position religion as traditional/backward that constrains women against the modern.
The second strand includes political studies conducted during this period that focus on Islamisation of the state and its negative impact on women's empowerment (Kabeer, 1991; Jahan, 1995) . These studies point out that the state has a contradictory position when it comes to women and Islam.
Reliance on aid meant that the state had taken an instrumental position and promoted women's inclusion in the economy and the public sphere.
However the need for political legitimacy led the political parties to take measures to bring back organised Islam into politics, allowing Islamist groups to function within public universities and Islamist newspapers and media to flourish (Karim, 2004) .
The third strand of scholarship which began largely in the mid-1990s explored the politics of religion in the society. These studies focussed particularly on the attacks on NGOs by the Islamist groups and fatwas in rural areas against women (Hashemi, 2000; Naher, 2010) . Studies also analysed discourses around the fatwa on Taslima Nasrin, a writer, for promoting minority and women's rights and critiquing Islam (Hashemi, 1995) . These studies explored how the 'politics of representation surrounding gender, modernity and Islam' (White 2010, p. 338 Recent feminist studies have questioned these easy binaries and explored how 'women are caught between...contradictory movements at the local/global levels' (White 2010, p. 338) , and how women negotiate or exercise agency by subverting, resisting or using religious framings (Shehabuddin, 2008b; Huq, 2008; Huq, 2010) . The emphasis on the latter two studies is to show that women's agency within religious structures and participation in religious groups do not necessarily translate into extremist activities. This interpretation is influenced by the analysis forwarded by Mahmood (2005) . These studies are also a reaction to correct the simplistic 
Contentious Episodes and Strengthening of Binary Framings
In this section, I examine selected episodes of contentions between the Islamist groups and women's movement actors to reveal how binary One of the women's rights activists I interviewed said:
[W]e had to engage to get them on board... to ensure marriages were registered and women could come to the meetings... To them we were short haired, Westernised/elite women, but we came from urban areas comments were insensitive and had damaged the gains made by the movement (Hashemi, 1995) . The Islamist political parties and the ulema grabbed this opportunity to portray women's rights groups as Westernised elites whose position on personal freedom and secularism undermined Islam (Hashemi, 2000) . 6 It was during this period that the use of fatwa against rural women for violating sexual/social/religious norms (i.e. pre-marital sex, extra-marital relations, violation of purdah norms) by local imams and mollahs gained attention. Women's movement actors intervened in specific cases, filed complaints, and mediated at the local level on behalf of the victimised women. Women's groups at the national level, particularly feminist lawyer groups, were able to intervene because of their members' class positions and networks. They also demanded legal change and argued that it was a modern state's obligation to protect its female citizens (interview, feminist When questioned about the use of fatwa against rural women and the work done by women's rights activists they were ambivalent. They were unable to deny the misuse of fatwa but argued that the members of women's rights groups were 'not schooled in fiqh and had limited engagement at the grassroots level'. The group pointed out that women's rights activists had limited understanding of the value of fatwas in the lives of people in need of guidance (group discussion, Nari Odhikar Andolon,
March 2011).
The ban on fatwa was later taken up by Hefazat E Islam to rally support.
Appeals were filed in the Supreme Court by two religious scholars, which led to the partial revoking of the ban. Undeniably, the actions by Jamaat I Islami and ulema and the position espoused by the women's groups associated with Jamaat, meant curtailing freedom of expression, and in the case of the partial revoking of the ban on fatwa, adversely affecting the rule of law and women's status.
The discussion above demonstrates how binary framings were used by the religious political parties and the ulema to delegitimise women's rights work and the women's rights advocates. It also shows how women rights actors attempted to counter these by using the language of rights, state obligation, and by alluding to the spirit of the Liberation War. But the limits of these counter-framings and the appeal of the binary framings become clear when we turn our attention to the National Women's Development Policy (NWDP).
The NWDP was formulated in 1997 by the state to meet its international obligation imposed on UN member states by the Beijing Platform for Action (PFA). The Bangladeshi state also wanted to enhance its gender friendly reputation. The 1997 policy contained visions and actions points for all critical areas identified under the PFA (Shahid, 2017) . The policy was later used by the women's movement actors to exhort the government to take action in specific areas by reminding the state to meet its national and international commitment (interview, women's rights activist 3, June 2008).
However, it was alleged by the Islamist groups that NWDP contained a clause that demanded equal property rights for women (interview, Jamat I Islami leader 2, March 2011; Islami Oikyo Jot leader 1, March 2011). In reality the policy contained no such clause. In 2008, protests were organised by Islami Okiyo Jot (IOJ), arguing that the policy was against Qu'ran and Shari'a (Shahid, 2017) . The women's rights groups also formed an alliance composed of 40 women's groups which protested the government's decision to form a review committee that included Islamic clerics. They argued that the ulema were against the spirit of the Liberation War and trying to promote fundamentalist politics (The Daily Star, 2008) . In interviews with male Jamat I Islami and IOJ leaders it became clear that apart from the issue of equal inheritance, the bone of contention was that the policy states that the state will fully implement the CEDAW. Article 2 of the CEDAW requires the state to reform all gender discriminatory laws which would mean changes in religious personal laws that govern marriage, divorce, inheritance, and custody (interview IOJ leader 2, March 2010).
The women's association closely linked to Jamaat did not diverge radically from the position held by the parent political party. They felt that the policy did not fall within the Islamic framework and needed to be revised. When probed about the question of inheritance, particularly property being important for poor women in rural areas, they argued that complementarity of gender roles meant that women can depend on male members of the family. They also argued that men should inherit the larger share as they are providers (group discussion, Nari Odhikar Andolon, March 2011). Interestingly, none of the members had read the policy.
Their views on the position taken by the women's rights groups was similar to that held by the male party leaders, that the women's movement was misdirected as these actors demanded equal rights based on the Western conceptualisation of rights. They argued that women's movement actors failed to understand that men inherited a larger portion as they had responsibilities from which women were exempted. They pointed out that by the male political leaders of Jamaat and the women's group associated with the party, of course, did not take into account that female headed households may be bereft of male guardianship or that in many cases male members are unwilling to meet their duties as providers.
The debates over the policy created a stir within the female Qu'ran reading groups, which are apolitical but many members have connections with Jamaat E Islami and other Islamist political parties. Interviews with women from one such group (all were professional women) revealed that they viewed family law reform as unnecessary which was similar to the views held by these parties. They also argued that the international conventions (CEDAW) were framed by Western countries, and these conventions are designed to undermine Islam and promote Western values. They felt that the UN and other organisations were not legitimate as these organisations were biased towards powerful Western countries. These arguments were also put forward by the male political leaders of Jamaat I Islami and other political parties.
When probed about whether women in the Qu'ran reading groups would be active in opposing the policy, they pointed out that they had discussed the policy at the community level meetings and have made public statements wherever possible. Whether they would come out onto the streets would depend on the leaders of the religious political parties. The women also argued that the women's rights groups should not claim they represent Bangladeshi women's interests, as these groups were not 'rooted in the real culture and beliefs of the country' (group discussion, Qu'ran reading group 3, March 2011).
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Even though the caretaker government had withdrawn the draft NWDP in 2008, it became a rallying point for garnering support for a range of Islamist actors and religious political parties. In 2011, a new draft policy was introduced by the AL which called for equal access for women to credit, land, and labour markets but it did not make any mention of legal changes to ensure equality of marriage, inheritance, divorce or custody in line with the CEDAW (Shahid, 2017) .A series of national protests were led by the IOJ against the policy. The religious political parties also changed tack. They Bangladesh's situation would be similar to that of Pakistan. However it was palpably clear that in street politics, women's movement activists were at a disadvantage, given their smaller numbers. As Hefazat had overtly disassociated itself from Jamat I Islami, it meant that the exhortations by the women's movement about the spirit of 1971 as a counter mobilisation strategy worked less well. This is because Jamat was culpable of the war crimes in 1971 and not the ulema. Also there was a disjuncture between the women's movement and how the large majority of the rural population and the new middle class perceived the role of religion and women's empowerment. These groups believed in women's right to work, healthcare, and education but they did not want to challenge the religious personal laws that governed private lives and also the core patriarchal structures.
In the end the policy itself was passed by the Cabinet. However NWDP came to symbolise the rise of the religious right wing in the shape of Hefazat E Islam, a deepening of the rift between religious and secular in the society, and with women's movement actors losing clout (Nazneen and Masud, 2017) . The AL which passed the policy later backtracked on its implementation. Ministers made public statements about taking into account the particular context in Bangladesh which was not amenable to all the provisions made in the CEDAW (Shahid, 2017) .The abolishment of the policy was later included in Hefazat's thirteen point demand that was discussed at the beginning of this article. group's willingness to engage with the public on policy reform matters also raises questions about whether they could be mobilised by political parties for causes that are distinctively anti-women. Admittedly, the women in religious groups covered in this paper do not subscribe to the extreme views held by some of the Islamists groups. However, the possibility of women in religious groups mobilising for causes that are distinctively antiwomen, raises the need to explore the broader implication of individual women's religious subjectivity and its link to collective agency not only in Hefazat E Islam to counter the rise of extremist groups linked to global terrorist networks in Bangladesh. The AL is vulnerable to pressure from religious quarters given its legitimacy has been questioned after the 2014 elections, which was boycotted by major opposition parties.
One of the ways that women's movement actors have been able to remain relevant is by weaving their demands with the reputation the AL has built around being a government that delivers social development. Women's empowerment is a major part of this narrative of development success (Hossain, 2017) . But is this a sustainable strategy to engage with the state?
The re-introduction of religious into the political space in the last decades nationally, regionally and globally coupled with Bangladesh's own historical experience with religious nationalism may mean that the space to raise doctrinal issues may shrink further and the strategies that were effective in the past to engage state actors may not work. The framings that are used such as universal rights and the types of actors who may support women's movement will change.
In fact, the women's movement faces significant challenges at present which means very difficult trade-offs. The rise of social media, which is extensively used by the new wave of Islamist groups, means that women's movement actors have to fight battles not just in the streets but also in the digital space, where they lack skills. The waning of donor power in 
